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Abstract  
 
Nuclear power is undergoing a revival in a number of countries of both developed 
and developing world, and is increasingly presented as a solution to the problems of 
climate change and energy security. This paper analyses the history of and the 
debates on nuclear power in France, the UK and Finland, all of which are in the 
process of either planning or building new nuclear plants. The paper traces the 
history of nuclear power since the early post-War years, distinguishing five distinct 
phases of development, from the early period of nuclear enthusiasm, through the 
emergence of doubt and risk in the 70s and 80s, to the recent ‘nuclear renaissance’. 
Emphasis in the analysis is placed on issue framings, argumentative strategies, the 
role of independent expertise, public opinion and the degree of openness of decision-
making. Key similarities, converging trends and differences between the countries are 
identified and tentative conclusions drawn on the potential stability of the current 
framing of nuclear energy as a response to the double challenge of climate change 
and energy security. 
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Introduction 
 
Nuclear energy has in recent years been undergoing a ‘renaissance’; after having been 
for a long time perceived as a safety risk and a source of environmental problems, it is 
today increasingly seen as a solution to the problems of climate change and energy 
security. In Europe, this renaissance started in earnest in 2002, when the Finnish 
parliament approved the construction of a new nuclear power station of the type EPR 
– European Pressurised Reactor. France followed suit soon afterwards, deciding first 
to launch the construction of a new EPR in Flamanville, Normandy, and later, in 
January 2009, another EPR in Penly, also in Normandy. The British government, in 
turn, declared its support for new nuclear in 2005, and declared in 2008 its 
commitment to facilitating the development of nuclear energy by the private sector. 
 
This paper reports on preliminary results from a Sussex Energy Group research 
project comparing the governance of nuclear energy in Finland, France and the UK. 
By drawing on documentary analysis and semi-structured key stakeholder interviews, 
the paper traces back the history of civil nuclear power in the three countries, to 
provide a background for understanding the current revival of nuclear energy. By 
focusing on the themes of issue framing, actors’ argumentative strategies, role of 
independent experts, public opinion, and transparency and public participation, the 
paper examines three key questions:  
 
1. How have the arguments and the priorities in the debates concerning decision-
making on the civilian use of nuclear energy evolved in the three countries since 
the birth of the industry in the 1950s? Which have been the key turning points in 
policy – the “critical discourse moments”1 during the evolution of the debates? 
2. Through which processes of interaction between actors have the framings2 around 
nuclear energy emerged? Which have been the main actors, and actor coalitions, 
and which argumentative strategies have they employed in order to further their 
case and impose their own framings? 
3. Which have been the main similarities and differences between the three countries 
in the factors conditioning the framing processes? 
 
In the following, the ‘nuclear histories’ of the three countries are presented 
chronologically, divided into five phases.  
 
 
                                                 
1 A critical discourse moment is here understood as an instance that magnifies the features of a frame 
by generating commentary and debate on a topic (Chilton 1987). 
2 A “frame” can be defined as a coherent constellation of facts, values, beliefs, theories and interests 
held by the participants within a given policy area (Hajer and Laws 2006, 257). Framing involves 
selecting certain aspects of the perceived reality and render them more salient in a message in order to 
promote a particular definition of a problem, a causal interpretation, a moral assessment, and/or a 
recommendation concerning the treatment of the subject (Entman 2002; Brugidou and Escoffier 2009). 
The concept of “framing” seeks to render more explicit the ways in which discursive processes 
contribute to the formulation of policies by making them more comprehensible and manageable 
(Jasanoff 2005, 23).  
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Period I: The post-war nuclear technocracy (1945-1973) 
 
The development of civil nuclear power in the early post-war years followed similar 
trajectories in France and the UK, where civil nuclear was developed to produce 
plutonium to support the military nuclear programmes. Military needs dictated the 
plant design, and little attention was therefore paid to capital and electricity 
generation costs. In Finland, by contrast, nuclear power was purely used for civilian 
purposes. Indeed, the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act (1987/2004) prohibits nuclear 
explosives and their manufacture, possession and detonation in Finland. Decision-
making on nuclear policy was in the hands of a small and closed elite of experts, and 
even parliaments had little say in policymaking. Nuclear energy embodied 
modernisation, industrialisation, and aspirations for technological achievement. In 
France, nuclear power was to contribute to the ‘radiance of France’ to counteract the 
country’s rapidly declining influence in the world politics (Fagnani and Moatti, 1984; 
Hecht, 1998). The state enterprises created to promote nuclear energy – in France the 
Commissariat of Nuclear Energy (CEA)3 and EDF (électricité de France), and in the 
UK the UK Atomic Energy Authority (UK AEA) and the Central Electricity 
Generating Board (CEGB) – had a unique position with their privileged access to 
capital and virtually unchallenged influence over policy (Hall 1986, 44; Tweena 2006; 
Hecht 1998). The disagreements, doubts, and knowledge about the technical and 
economic problems detected in the nuclear plants were carefully kept inside this elite. 
Despite the economic and technical problems, including construction delays, the 
governments’ enthusiasm for nuclear power remained strong. (Tweena 2006).  
 
In France, the ‘nucleocracy’ was composed of the government and ’official’ technical 
experts belonging to the “grands corps” (notably the “Corps des Mines”), 
polytechnics from the prestigious engineering schools, (Topçu, 2006, 251). Expertise 
independent of the state was virtually non-existent. A broad cross-party consensus 
prevailed on the pivotal role that scientific and technological progress should play in 
the reconstruction and modernisation of the nation (Topçu, 2006, 250).  
 
In the UK, discussions concerned the choice of the reactor type. The options under 
consideration were the AEA’s Magnox and the American Light Water Reactor 
(LWR) in the 50s, and the British Advanced Gas-Cooled Reactor (AGR) and the US 
Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR) in the early 60s. The choice fell on the AGR, the 
model preferred by the AEA – a further demonstration of the political clout of the 
nuclear technocracy. Foreign and industrial policy considerations weighed heavily in 
choices between e.g. British and foreign plant designs (Tweena 2006). 
 
Initially, both CEA and AEA exercised simultaneously the function of the developer, 
safety expert and safety authority, and the separation of powers took place only 
gradually over the years (Foasso, 2003, 8-9).4 
 
                                                 
3 Commissariat à l’énergie nucléaire. 
4 For instance in France, the CEA lost its role as developer in 1967, when a new safety organisation 
was created, composed of participants from the EDF, CEA and industrialists. 
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Reactor choices were also high in the discussion in Finland, largely affected by 
politics of the cold war. The Finnish state-owned energy company Imatran Voima 
(IVO) invited ‘turn key’ tenders for the country’s first nuclear power plant in the mid-
1960s. The interest in nuclear power was very much led by engineers, such as 
Professor Erkki Laurila, who laid the foundations for technology transfer from 
western suppliers of nuclear power plants, especially the US (Michelsen, 2007). The 
Finnish government was keen to use western nuclear power technology and initially 
chose a West German AEG reactor.  However, Finland was under pressure to opt for 
a Soviet reactor and the government agreed to order two Novo Voronesh -type 
VVER- light water pressurised reactors, despite the fact that the bid from the Soviets 
had failed to make the final stages of the tendering process (Michelsen, 2007). 
Finally, a turn-key contract could not be realised, for the lack of sufficient safety 
expertise by the Soviets, and hence IVO was left to build the reactors (Loviisa 1 and 
Loviisa 2) on its own accord (Michelsen, 2007). In the cold war climate, neither the 
government nor President Kekkonen was keen to jeopardise relationships between 
Finland and the Soviet Union (Sunell, 2004).  
 
While the early days of the nuclear industry’s development where heavily influenced 
by the presence of the neighbouring Soviet Union, Finland’s industry did not give up 
hopes of building a western nuclear power plant. Energy decisions in Finland have 
always been strongly linked to issues of national security and sovereignty, particularly 
given Finland’s relationship with neighbouring Soviet Union/Russia. Hence it is 
important to ask who is building nuclear power and to whom (Sunell, 2004). 
 
Energy company Teollisuuden Voima (TVO) was founded in 1969 by 16 Finnish 
industrial (mainly forestry) and power companies, primarily to allow the forest 
industry to build its own nuclear capacity. As the Finnish state was in the process of 
buying its first nuclear plant from the Soviet Union, TVO decided in 1970 that it 
wanted to buy its own nuclear reactor. Even though electricity supply was state-run at 
the time, in December 1970 the government gave TVO the permission to buy a 
nuclear plant from Sweden (Sunell, 2004). However, the decision was not made 
public until September 1971 even though the Finnish media was kept up to date on 
the developments (and agreed to keep quiet about it) (ibid.). Parliament did not 
contest the decisions to build nuclear reactors. In fact, Parliament passed an “Atomic 
responsibility” law in 1972 and gave permission for the state to release part of 
Olkiluoto island for TVO’s reactors in 1973 (Sunell, 2004), three years after the first 
reactors were bought from the Soviet Union. 
 
TVO’s key motivation was to establish western nuclear technology in Finland. 
Eventually also the Finnish state became a part-owner in TVO with a 25% share of 
ownership (Sunell, 2004). From the very beginning TVO was, and still continues to 
be, an unusual energy company in that its main operating principle is to supply 
electricity to its shareholders on a self-financing basis.  Based on “the Mankala-
 5 
principle”5, TVO’s shareholders’ share gives them the right for equal amount of 
TVO’s energy production, and equally requires shareholders to be responsible for 
their share of any capital costs (Sunell 2004). Over 90% of TVO’s electricity 
production comes from nuclear, with the remaining just 9% from coal and the 
company has a small amount of wind power.  TVO does not supply electricity directly 
to the electricity market.   
 
The media reporting on nuclear energy in Finland, France and the UK was highly 
positive. Criticism generally concerned only the military use of nuclear technology, 
seen as an example ’abuse of science’, and contrasted with the ’responsible’ use of 
science to promote peace and well-being of the humanity through civil nuclear power 
(Topçu, 2006). Public fears concerning nuclear safety were predominantly interpreted 
through the ‘deficit model’ of public attitudes, as an ‘infantile regression’ of a kind, a 
fear felt by the citizens when confronted by scientific progress, the details of which 
were beyond their comprehension (Barthe 2006; Wynne 1991). 
 
Despite the enthusiasm and the ambitious plans, the share of nuclear power in 
electricity supply remained modest. In France, nuclear power generated less than 1% 
of the country’s electricity in 1960 and only 4% in 1970s (Fontaine, 2006, 20). The 
slow progress was largely due to the scepticism of the Ministry of Finance towards 
the allegedly overoptimistic economic appraisals made by the EDF engineers 
(Hadjilambrinos 2000, 1115). In Finland, electricity was generated mainly by 
hydropower until the early 1970s. Loviisa 1 nuclear power plant became operational 
in 1977 and had a capacity of 488 megawatts (MW), supplying only a small 
proportion of Finland’s total electricity demand, but nuclear generation has since risen 
to around 27% of total electricity production.  
 
Period II: The emergence of risk, radical contestation and fear (1974-
1980) 
 
UK 
 
By the mid-70s, notably as a result of the first oil crisis in October 1973, first cracks 
emerged in the positive image of civil nuclear in the UK. The ‘technocratic rules of 
the game’, secrecy and the unquestioned legitimacy of scientists, had hitherto ensured 
that nuclear energy retained its positive image, as a range of issues, including safety, 
cost, need and risk were kept off the policy agenda (Saward 1992, 95; Rough 2009, 
14). The technical, safety and economic problems now gradually entered public 
discussion arenas. Three key turning points, or ‘critical discourse moments’, 
contributed to the emergence of anti-nuclear opposition and a discourse centred 
around the risks of nuclear, beginning from the mid-70 (Rough 2009, 14-15). 
 
                                                 
5 Mankala Oy was one of the first power companies established by several industrial operators in the 
1930’s, and TVO based its operating principle on the Mankala Principle, i.e. shareholders receive 
energy supply equal to the amount of their shares in the company.   
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Firstly, the oil crisis put an end to the ever-increasing growth of electricity demand 
and led a radical revision of future demand forecasts. Financing the capital-intensive 
nuclear projects became a major issue, and the behind-the-scenes disputes between 
the AEA and CEGB on the scale of the nuclear programme became public, as energy 
issues entered on the political and media agendas. A new breed of environmental 
organisations emerged to challenge the nuclear programme on social, ethical and 
moral grounds.6 Partly as a result of the opposition, and partly because the Tory 
government was busy dealing with the economic crisis and miners’ strikes, the 
launching of UK’s third nuclear programme was postponed until the entry in power 
by the Labour in 1974 (Greenaway et al. 1992, 128). 
 
Another ‘critical discourse moment’ was the publication of the Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution (RCEP) report Nuclear Power and the Environment7 in 
September 1976. The report authoritatively questioned the UK AEA’s tacit 
acceptance of the inevitability of the Fast Breeder Reactor and the potential harm that 
the resulting ‘plutonium economy’ could cause to civil liberties and national security 
(Rough 2009, 13; see also Flood and Grove-White, 1976). The report argued that 
nuclear power raised particularly complex long-term issues of not only technical, but 
also of political and ethical nature. The RCEP also blamed the authorities for having 
neglected the issue of radioactive waste management (RCEP 1976, 198). 
 
The public opposition and RCEP’s criticism did not change the substance of the UK 
nuclear policy, yet they forced the government to adopt a more open policy style, 
epitomised by the six-month Windscale Public Inquiry in 1977. The inquiry was held 
in response to British Nuclear Fuels’ (BNFL) application to build a thermal oxide 
reprocessing plant (THORP) for spent UK and overseas nuclear fuels (Hall 1986), a 
project which critics argued would turn the UK into the “World’s Nuclear Wastebin” 
(Williams 1980, 289, in Tweena 2006, 12). While the inquiry has been hailed as a 
‘landmark in British nuclear policy making’ (Hall, 1986: 161), for its broad scope and 
participatory approach (Shore 1977 cited in McAuslan 1979, 15), the final report was 
criticised for failing to justify why the arguments of the opposition had been rejected. 
(Patterson 1985, 126, in Rough 2009, 16). 
 
As part of the Thatcher government’s liberalisation agenda, the Department of Energy 
White Paper from 1988, Privatising Electricity, proposed to decentralise and remove 
electricity supply and generation from public ownership (Department of Energy 1988; 
Nuttall 2005). However, the privatisation revealed the poor economics of nuclear 
power: once the industry came under the economic appraisal by the City, its 
reputation as a cheap source of electricity vanished quickly. It was widely recognized 
that nuclear power stations, with their poor reliability record and uncertain 
decommissioning costs, would present particular difficulties for privatisation plans. 
                                                 
6 New NGOs included Friends of the Earth (FoE), the Council for the Protection of Rural England 
(CPRE) and the Town and Country Planning Association (TCPA) gathered momentum throughout the 
1970s and 1980s (see, for example Flood and Grove White 1976; FoE 1978; Lovins 1977; Stott et al. 
1980). 
7 Frequently referred to as ‘the Flowers report’, according to the commission’s chairman, Sir Brian 
Flowers. 
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Despite the mounting criticism, the government announced a new nuclear programme 
in 1982. Ten PWR reactors, providing a further 15,000 MW of capacity (Greenaway 
1992, 130), were to be built, officially to enhance energy security, but allegedly also 
to crush the politically power of the coal miners’ union (Hall 1986, 173, in Tweena 
2006, 12).  
 
The first plant was to be constructed in Sizewell, Suffolk, and – in keeping with the 
environment minister’s promise – A broad public consultation held between January 
1983 and March 1985 in Sizewell, Suffolk – the first of the ten plants to be built – 
gave the public an unprecedented right to participate (Greenaway et al. 1992, 130). 
Yet the opposition criticised the process for having been a “meeting of closed minds” 
as the CEGB’s construction plans were approved without any major modifications 
(Kay 2001). The nuclear programme ran into problems also due to technical problems 
in the AGR plants, the deteriorating relations between the CEGB and British Nuclear 
Fuels (BNFL), and the chronic underestimations in cost calculations (Rough 2009, 
18). Doubts over the economic viability of the stations, eventually led the government 
to retreat from its plans to privatise the nuclear industry. Instead, a public company, 
Nuclear Electric, was created to run the AGRs and Sizewell B (Greenaway et al. 
1992, 132). Thatcher’s ambitious programme of ten new reactors shrunk to one as 
Sizewell B remained the last nuclear reactor built or ordered in the UK (Tweena 2006, 
12). 
 
Attempts were made to find a suitable way of dealing with radioactive waste – a 
problem first highlighted by the RCEP in 1976 and later to become nuclear power’s 
‘Achilles Heel’.8 The AEA’s search for geologically suitable sites for a high-level 
radioactive waste repository in Scotland’s Highlands faced intense local opposition, 
and finally, in 1980, led to the first public inquiry on the disposal of radioactive waste 
in the UK (Simmons and Bickerstaff 2006).  The Nuclear Industry Radioactive Waste 
Management Executive (NIREX) was created in 1982 to oversee waste disposal. 
Financed by the nuclear industry, Nirex failed to engender the public and stakeholder 
confidence needed to gain acceptance to its planned disposal sites for low and 
intermediate level radioactive waste (Blowers 1999, 244; Simmons and Bickerstaff 
2006). 
 
The slowly emerging ‘discourse of fear’ around nuclear energy was buttressed by 
increasingly critical media reporting. In 1983, a TV programme revealing child 
leukaemia rates twelve times the national average among Sellafield families led to 
media and public demands for an investigation (Dalquist 2004, 22; Tweena 2006, 16) 
The earlier positive and enthusiastic media reporting was now increasingly replaced 
by critical accounts by environment journalists, echoing views from the rising 
environmental movement. Parliament gradually emerged as an actor in decisions 
concerning nuclear energy. (Tweena 2006) While the public opinion remained 
predominantly positive towards nuclear energy (Rough 2009),the AEA and the 
                                                 
8 "The popular opposition that was once in evidence against the building of nuclear power stations is 
now directed against the construction of these storage sites" (Zonabend 1993, 128). 
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nuclear industry were greatly weakened by the rising public doubt and opposition 
(Tweena 2006). The financial sector actors gained a central position at this period, 
while, despite the rising public fear and scepticism, the anti-nuclear NGOs remained 
weak. 
 
France  
 
The French government responded to the first oil crisis by implementing in 1974 a 
massive programme of nuclear power known as the ‘Messmer plan, designed to 
guarantee the country’s energy independence. The following 15 years saw the 
construction of 56 nuclear reactors, and an increase in the share of nuclear in 
electricity supply from 4% in 1970 to 24% in 1980 and further to 74% in 1990 
(Fontaine, 2006, 20). The programme triggered a wave of at times violent opposition, 
which lasted until the entry into power of the socialist government in 1981. 
 
In response to the radical anti-nuclear protest, the government launched a campaign to 
reassure teachers and local politicians about the safety of the French nuclear power 
(Topçu, 2006, 252). The critics focused their arguments on the health and radiation 
effects, impacts on the natural environment, and the distribution of benefits 
disproportionately in favour to the ‘big capital’ and the large cities (Hadjilambrinos 
2000, 1116). The conflict concretised in the siting decisions for nuclear installations 
(Foasso, 2003, 10), and since 1971, mass protests were organised at nearly every 
planned nuclear site until the massive demonstration at the Superphénix breeder 
reactor in Creys-Malville in 1977 culminated in violence (Nelkin and Pollak 1982, 3). 
In 1976, 55% of the French population was hostile to nuclear power and the anti-
nuclear movement had managed to penetrate the local representative politics 
(Hadjilambrinos 2000, 1116). As in the UK, the protest had little impact on actual 
decision-making, for a number of reasons. Firstly, the government made only 
symbolic gestures to accommodate the demands of the anti-nuclear movement.9 
Secondly, the anti-nuclear movement remained isolated in the face of the broad cross-
party consensus on the orientation of energy policy, and the power exercised by the 
nuclear technocracy in policymaking. The French electoral system barred the entry to 
Parliament by minority parties, keeping anti-nuclear views out of official policy 
arenas (Hadjilambrinos 2000, 1117). Finally, and somewhat paradoxically, the entry 
into power of the socialist government in 1981 depoliticised the choices concerning 
nuclear energy. The left-wing oriented anti-nuclear movement lost speed, as the ruling 
socialist party embraced nuclear as part of its highly ‘scienticist’ convictions (Topçu, 
2006), supported by the highly pro-nuclear trade unions (Chateauraynaud and Torny 
1999; Topçu 2008). Once in power, the Mitterrand government adhered to its 
electoral promise to reconsider the nuclear programme, but the EDF engineers 
managed to persuade the president that the abandonment of the nuclear programme 
would incur excessive on the French society (Hadjilambrinos 2000, 1118). 
 
                                                 
9 For instance, a public inquiry process was to be required prior to construction of a nuclear plant, yet 
this process was essentially controlled by the developer, the EDF, and never led to the rejection of a 
construction project (Hadjilambrinos 2000, 1117). 
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Despite the change of government, even the most contested elements of the nuclear 
programme remained in place, notably the extension of the La Hague nuclear waste 
processing plant and the development of fast breeder reactors (Barthe, 2006). 
Discussions concerning nuclear safety almost disappeared from the media from 1980 
onwards, as economic problems attracted the bulk of the attention. (Chateauraynaud 
and Torny, 1999) 
 
Yet, the vibrancy of the environmentalist and anti-nuclear movement in the 1970s 
helped to bring about ‘counter-expertise’ on nuclear matters. A group of scientists 
launched in February 1975 a petition against what they considered as an excessively 
ambitious nuclear programme, pointing out a number of environmental and security 
problems overlooked by the ‘official’ nuclear experts. The “Appel des 400” openly 
challenged the hitherto prevailing idea of the neutral, objective and apolitical scientist, 
and gave rise to the first “counter-expertise” organisation in the French nuclear 
policy, the GSIEN10 in November 1975. The GSIEN scientists scrutinised official 
documents and systematically monitored health impacts caused by radioactivity from 
nuclear installations. (Topçu, 2006, 252-254) 
 
Despite the emergence of ‘counter-expertise’, decision-making remained firmly in the 
hands of the engineers, and the government sought to reassure the public, rather than 
foster transparency. The technical problems detected in the French reactors in 1979 
were kept secret and led to yet more powers being delegated to technical safety 
experts, who had until then in vain called for several improvements in safety control 
(Foasso, 2003). 
 
A first attempt away from the technocratic policy style in radioactive waste 
management was the establishment of a multistakeholder expert commission in 1981, 
in response to the failures to gain public acceptance for a disposal site. The national 
radioactive waste management authority (ANDRA) was created in 1979 within CEA, 
thus in practice institutionalising geological disposal as the preferred long-term 
objective of radioactive waste management. Local liaison committees (CLIs) were 
established in 1981, to inform populations in the proximity of nuclear installations. 
The nuclear establishment began to see anti-nuclear protest no longer as a sign of 
individual irrationality, but as an element of larger, political and social mobilisations 
(Barthe, 2006, 77-87). 
 
Finland 
 
The 1970s oil crises gave TVO the motivation to increase its nuclear generation. TVO 
had agreed on a capped price with Swedish AB ASEA in 1972 for a possible second 
reactor. Given the high prices of oil and nuclear reactors, increasing generation 
seemed like an attractive opportunity for TVO (Sunell, 2004). In August 1974 TVO 
published its decision to buy a second 660 MW reactor from Sweden. In the 
meantime, construction of IVO’s Loviisa 1 reactor had started and the work was 
                                                 
10 Groupement des scientifiques pour l’information sur l’énergie nucléaire. 
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completed on schedule in 1977 (Sunell, 2004). Loviisa 2 reactor was finally 
completed late of the schedule, in 1981. TVO’s Olkiluoto 1 became operational in 
1979 and Olkiluoto 2 in 1982. With Finland having four reactors built in a short space 
of time, the country had considerable electricity supply capacity in the late 1970s 
early 1980s (ibid.). The Finnish labour movement and trade unions were strong 
supporters of the nuclear industry, arguing that sovereign electricity production was 
crucial for the country’s heavy industry, especially forestry, metal and paper sectors 
(Sund, 2009). This argument has persisted amongst the largest trade unions to this 
date (ibid.). 
 
Like in the UK and France, the 1970’s saw also the rise of the anti-nuclear movement 
in Finland, even though the majority of the population still saw nuclear power as 
unproblematic (Kantola, 2004). Anti-nuclear movements formed especially near 
suggested reactor sites and small groups were set up in Inkoo and Sipoo in 1974 
(Kojo, 2004b). Further groups and campaigns formed in the following years, 
including “Association for Energy Policy - Alternative for nuclear energy” in 1977 
and the first Scandinavian anti-nuclear campaign in 1978 (ibid.). Like in the UK, 
nuclear energy was now contested on its technical, safety and economic aspects, 
especially following the Three Mile Island accident in 1979. The government started 
to note the environmental impacts of nuclear power and these were mentioned in the 
government’s Energy Policy Strategy in 1982 (Kyllönen, 2004). Furthermore, a 
decision in principle was made in 1983 regarding research and development in 
nuclear waste (Kojo, 2004b). The government initially wanted to export Finnish 
nuclear waste but in the end opted for the Swedish (and American) radioactive waste 
management solution. This does not involve reprocessing but used radioactive 
material is considered as waste for long-term disposal. Finland started identifying 
possible domestic nuclear waste depository sites in the early 1980’s (Kojo, 2004a). 
Despite opposition for nuclear power and issues concerning safety, IVO and TVO 
wanted to build a 5th reactor and started a joint campaign for this in 1982 (Kojo, 
2004b). However, it would take another twenty years for Finland to decide on a 5th 
reactor.  
 
Period III: Post-Chernobyl, liberalisation and the retreat of the 
nuclear industry (1987-1996) 
 
UK 
 
As a powerful visual symbol of the nuclear opposition’s fears over nuclear safety and 
risk the Chernobyl accident marked the definite end to the already ailing nuclear 
sector’s hopes of recovery, as nuclear power was now predominantly framed in terms 
of its risks. “[t]he power, knowledge and authority of the UK AEA, the CEGB and the 
government was challenged, destabilised and ultimately discredited” (Rough 2009, 
16). New groups had gained access to the policy arena, and opened up the previously 
closed nature of decision-making on nuclear energy. However, the ‘new’ framing 
around the risks of nuclear energy did not erase, but came to compete against and 
coevolve with the original framing around the ‘promise of civil nuclear energy’ 
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(Rough 2006, 17). The technocratic nature of energy policy persisted, as decision-
making was led by energy ministry officials, with little involvement from the public 
and Parliament, and only weak political leadership from the Cabinet.11 Economics 
came to dominate debate on nuclear power, and security of supply faded to the 
background as the influence of OPEC declined, the miners’ union was defeated, oil 
prices fell, and the North Sea oil and gas fields provided cheap domestic energy. 
(Rough 2009, 18) 
 
A de facto moratorium on new nuclear build was declared in 1989, pending a five-
year review (Wakeham cited in Stenzel 2003, 16; Tweena 2006, 13). British Energy 
(previously Nuclear Electric) was privatised in 1996 and has been struggling 
financially ever since. (Tweena 2006, 13)  
 
In response to recurrent problems and local opposition to waste disposal sites, Nirex 
changed its strategy in 1987, most notably involving efforts to develop a more 
participatory planning approach (Simmons and Bickerstaff 2006). 
 
 
France 
 
Despite Chernobyl, the French nuclear programme continued, and the share of nuclear 
in electricity supply reached 74% in 1990. However, the expansion was slowed down 
by the high capital costs of the massive investments, and the need to export 
oversupply electricity at below-cost price (Hadjilambrinos 2000, 1118). 
 
The Chernobyl accident had three significant impacts: it accelerated the separation of 
powers between actors responsible for the development and control of the industry, 
contributed to an increasing public scepticism towards the state ‘nucleocracy’, and 
fostered the rise of counter-expertise. 
 
The numerous technical problems detected in the French reactors in the late 1980s 
increased safety authorities weight in decision-making12, and the separation of 
technical, regulatory and developmental functions within the industry. ‘Counter-
expertise’ earned a more legitimate role in safety control, and the safety authorities 
increasingly saw themselves as defenders of the rights of the citizens, rather than as 
advocates of state interests. The ability of a government body to control industries in 
the name of public interest was increasingly called into question.  (Foasso, 2003) 
 
The government’s overt attempts to conceal from the public the full extent and impact 
of the fallout from Chernobyl13 was among the first events sowing the seeds of the 
                                                 
11 Emblematic to the prevailing ethos in this era of liberalisation was the famous announcement of the 
‘death of energy policy’ by the Nigel Lawson, then Prime Minister Thatcher’s Secretary of State for 
Energy, and the abolishment of the Department of Energy ten years later. 
12 Buttressed by the pressure from the IAEA, with its urge to develop a ‘culture of safety’ to prevent 
similar accidents from happening again. 
13 The government famously claimed, through the voice of TV weather forecasters, for instance, that 
the radioactive “cloud” stopped at the country’s border. 
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continuous erosion of public trust in the nuclear technocracy in particular and the 
‘official’ state expertise in general.14 Two associations of ‘pluralist expertise’, each 
with their own independent laboratories for measuring radioactivity, were created in 
reaction to the ‘Chernobyl cloud scam’: ACRO (Association pour le contrôle de la 
radioactivité à l’Ouest) in Normandy and CRIIRAD (Commission de recherché et 
d’information indépendantes sur la radioactivité) in the Southeast. These 
organisations set up their. Scientists were no longer at the heart of the movements, but 
instead provided advice to the movements driven by citizen activists. Like the GSIEN 
in the 1970s, ACRO and CRIIRAD still remained moderate and ‘responsible’ in their 
criticism, not calling into question nuclear power as such, but aiming to ensure its 
proper functioning through continuous surveillance.15 (Topçu, 2006, 254-255) 
 
The radioactive waste management policy faced a stalemate in the end of the 1980s, 
as a result of vehement local protest against test drillings, which lead the government 
to declare in February 1990 a moratorium in the investigations. The subsequent 
‘Bataille Law’ (1991) on radioactive waste management marked a step towards a 
more democratic decision-making process, designed to put an end to the “cult of 
secrecy” that had hitherto prevailed in nuclear policy. The Bataille Law reopened the 
research on alternatives to long-term geological disposal, and introduced new 
participants (including social scientists) in the debate. It also fostered a change in the 
role of experts, who would no longer be expected only to answer pre-defined policy 
questions, but also to facilitate the exploration of different policy options (Barthe, 
2006). 
 
European legislation on transparency and citizen participation16 pushed the French 
nuclear establishment towards more openness. A number of laws were enacted to 
foster local, participatory democracy.17 In particular, the creation of a National 
Commission of Public Debate (CNDP) in 1995, as a response to criticism concerning 
the shortcomings of the ‘public inquiry’ process18 marked a major milestone. CNDP 
was entrusted with a mandate to organise public debates and ensure public 
participation in infrastructure projects and policies of national interest, which have 
significant socio-economic or environmental impacts or implications for land use 
planning. The CNDP’s operating principles are very close to those of the 
Habermasian deliberative democracy,19 and the commission has the mandate to 
                                                 
14 A process that would continue in the subsequent years with a number of public scandals and 
controversies such as the ‘contaminated blood’ affair (1991), BSE, asbestos, and GMOs (e.g. 
Chateauraynaud and Torny 1999; Chateauraynaud 2009). 
15 Later on, the state granted the laboratories of ACRO and CRIIRAD the status as official laboratories 
for monitoring radioactivity. 
16 For instance the EURATOM Directive 89/618 and the Directive on Environmental Impact 
Assessment (1985). 
17 For instance, the Loi d’orientation sur la Ville 1991, Loi sur l’administration territoriale 1992, and 
the Loi Barnier (1992), which included provisions on citizen participation. 
18 A procedure created in the 1830s to consult landowners in major infrastructure projects, and since 
the 1970s incorporating the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedure. 
19 The Habermasian deliberative democracy adopts as its key normative starting point the so-called 
ideal speech situation, characterised by the absence of any other force than that of the better argument. 
Rather than representativeness in terms of traditional interest group representation, the Habermasian 
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ensure that the voices of the less powerful get heard. The CNDP does not have 
decision-making power, nor does it give recommendations.20 
 
Finland 
 
The Chernobyl accident had its effects in Finland too, not least since it took place in 
the neighbouring Soviet Union. This had a long lasting effect on Finnish energy 
policy, much to the dissatisfaction of the nuclear industry. While the country had built 
four nuclear reactors in a relatively short space of time in the 1970s and early 1980s, 
Chernobyl meant that plans for new reactors were put to rest and IVO and TVO 
pulled out their application for a 5th nuclear reactor in 1986. The accident was also 
reflected in Finnish opinion polls. While in 1983 Finnish Energy Attitudes survey 
showed that 24.4% supported the increase in nuclear power (Hoikka et al, 1983), in 
1986 this had dropped to 16.3% (Kiljunen et al, 1986).  Furthermore, the amount of 
people who wanted to phase out nuclear power increased considerably after the 
accident, from 21.3% in 1983 (Hoikka et al, 1983) to 34.5% in 1986 (Kiljunen, 1986).  
 
Debate during the post-Chernobyl period in Finland largely centred around the issue 
of safety and nuclear waste. Having made a decision-in-principle in 1983 about 
nuclear waste, much of the late 1980s were spent finding the best waste management 
solution.  In 1987 the government passed the Nuclear Energy Act (1987/2004) which 
required that “the use of nuclear energy, taking into account its various effects, shall 
be in line with the overall good of society” (Section 5 of the Nuclear Energy Act). 
Furthermore, the Act requires that all nuclear waste generated in Finland must be 
“handled, stored and permanently disposed of in Finland”. The only exceptions, laid 
down by decree, are small amounts of nuclear waste which are delivered abroad for 
research purposes or nuclear waste generated in a research reactor in Finland. The 
same applies to waste from abroad: “nuclear waste generated elsewhere than in 
Finland, shall not be handled, stored or permanently disposed of in Finland”, except 
for “small amounts of nuclear waste which are delivered to Finland for research 
purposes; or (2) nuclear waste of unknown origin referred to in section 80(1)”. 
(1987/2004). Posiva, the company responsible for radioactive waste management in 
Finland and partly owned by the state, applied for a “decision-in-principle” in 1999 to 
have Eurajoki, the location of the Olkiluoto plants, as the site for final deposition of 
nuclear waste. The Finnish government gave permission in 2000 for Posiva to start 
site investigation and construction of an underground research facility in Olkiluoto. 
Posiva estimated at the time that waste disposal would start in 2020. Funding for 
nuclear waste management in Finland is collected as a “nuclear waste management 
fee” which is included in the price of electricity from nuclear plants. A state-run 
                                                                                                                                            
ideal therefore emphasises equity between the participants and equal, unconstrained access to 
deliberation by all participants. 
20 A group of six independent experts, a ‘Commission particulière du débat public’ (CPDP), is set up 
to organise and facilitate the debate. Interested parties are invited to submit position papers, which the 
CPDP uses to compile a summary view from the participants. CPDP then often invites new participants 
to provide counter-appraisals. Within three months from the end of the four-month debate, the 
developer must inform about its decision and the way in which it has taken the debate into account in 
decision-making. 
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Nuclear Waste Management Fund holds the collected fees, which are then returned to 
nuclear power operators during various phases of the waste management process. 
However, there is still a lack of evidence as to what is a “secure” disposal of nuclear 
waste as much of the research is based on probabilities and lacks previous experience 
in long term disposal of nuclear waste (Kojo, 2004b). 
 
Period IV: Return of radical criticism (FRA 1997-2002), the ‘death of 
nuclear’ (UK 1997-2005) and round 1 plans for a 5th reactor (FIN)  
 
UK 
 
When taking office in 1997, Tony Blair’s New Labour government introduced the 
principles of ‘evidence-based policy’ and New Public Management, in an attempt to 
increase efficiency of state bureaucracy and strengthen its political steering. New 
Labour also promised to enhance local-level democracy through greater citizen 
engagement and decentralisation.21 Nuclear power continued to be framed in terms of 
economics, perceived essentially as an expensive form of electricity generation. 
 
At the turn of the century, the UK energy policy saw a shift both in form and 
substance. Climate change took centre stage in energy policy, partly in response to the 
UK Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP) report calling for the a 
60% greenhouse gas emission reduction from 1998 levels by 2050. The subsequent 
Energy Review by the government’s newly established Performance and Innovation 
Unit (PIU) picked up the RCEP’s recommendations and placed climate change at the 
heart of energy policy. Importantly, the preparation of the review was unusually open 
and engaged a variety of stakeholders. Emphasising energy saving and efficiency, 
renewables, and reduction of transport-related GHG emissions, it remained lukewarm 
about nuclear energy. Markets and competition were no longer the centrepiece of 
energy policy, and greater government intervention was advocated to respond to the 
climate and energy security challenges. (MacKerron 2009) 
 
The new Energy Review process, launched by the DTI in May 2002 in preparation of 
an Energy White Paper, displayed openness and transparency never before seen in 
UK energy policy, involving both public and stakeholder engagement22 (DTI 2007; 
(MacKerron 2009) 
 
The White Paper established four general goals for the UK energy policy: combating 
climate change was flagged up as the primary objective, followed by those relating to 
energy security, competitive markets, and fuel poverty eradication. It devoted little 
space to nuclear energy, which was considered uneconomical in the prevailing 
circumstances, and hampered by the unresolved issue of radioactive waste 
                                                 
21 Characterised by Duffy and Hutchinson (1997) as ‘turn to the community’. 
22 Such as stakeholder workshops, meetings, conferences, seminars, citizen focus groups, deliberative 
workshops, an outreach programme to school students, and a web-based questionnaire. 
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management. The ‘fullest public consultation’ and a further White Paper would 
precede any decision to build new nuclear power stations.23 
 
As part of the ‘new transparency’ in energy policy the Committee on Radioactive 
Waste Management (CoRWM) was set up in November 2003 as an independent body 
to advice the government on the management of the country’s legacy radioactive 
waste. The committee was novel in its plural composition and its ambition to integrate 
scientific analysis with public and stakeholder engagement (PSE). CoRWM was to 
inspire public trust and re-establish the credibility of experts, which had suffered not 
only because of the failures in nuclear waste policy, but also due to crises such as the 
BSE (CoRWM 2006)(Chilvers and Burgess 2008). In its final report in July 2006, the 
committee concluded in favour of geological disposal, but called for an accompanying 
robust programme of research on interim storage (CoRWM 2006). 
 
Many interpreted the White Paper 2003 as a final blow to nuclear power in the UK, 
and as the beginning of a new era of openness and transparency in energy policy. 
Already in the late 1990s, notably after the success of the Friends of the Earth in 1997 
to block planning permission for an underground research laboratory on geological 
disposal at Sellafield, the belief in the ‘death of the nuclear’ had led NGOs to scale 
down their anti-nuclear campaigns and focus instead on climate change, energy 
efficiency and renewables. In the hindsight, this change of focus may have been 
premature, given the nuclear industry’s continuing position, despite privatisation, as a 
“protected species”, subsidised by the taxpayer.24 Devoid of its monopoly power, the 
nuclear industry nevertheless retained “a comfortable position in terms of insider 
contacts and access to public resources”. As part of its ‘adaptation and retreat’ 
strategy, the industry was prompted to sharpen its communication strategies, in an 
attempt to seize dominance in the ‘macro discursive spheres’ (Hendriks 2006). Its 
media offensive centred around attempts to create an image of a ‘green’ industry 
capable of “keeping the lights on”. In reorienting their campaigns away from nuclear 
risks, the NGOs hence let the nuclear industry reframe the debate in terms of climate 
change and energy security. (Tweena 2006) 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 Statements by the Energy Secretary Patricia Hewitt during the announcement of the energy White 
Paper illustrate government’s official line of argument (sourced from Greenpeace website on 20 Feb 
2009, http://www.greenpeace.org.uk/media/press-releases/greenpeace-response-to-energy-white-paper-
announcement?print): 
"If we achieve a step change in both energy efficiency and renewables we will be able beyond 2020 to 
move to 2050 without the need for a generation of nuclear power stations..." 
"Energy efficiency is by far the cheapest and simplest way of meeting all our policy goals in this area." 
"It would have been foolish to announce...that we would embark on a new generation of nuclear power 
stations because that would have guaranteed that we would not make the necessary investment in both 
energy efficiency and renewables. That is why we are not going to build a new generation of nuclear 
power stations now." 
24 The BNFL and AEA remain in the hands of the DTI and provide advice to government; the bodies 
responsible for radioactive waste management – NDA and Nirex – are publicly owned and funded; and 
British Energy’s survival has depended on the government’s willingness to provide it with credit 
facility and underwrite its liabilities. (Tweena 2006). 
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France 
 
The 1990s had seen a mounting criticism against the secretive decision-making on 
risk-related issues, which now occupied a central place on the public agenda, thanks 
to the action by ‘counter-experts’ and ‘whistleblowers’ (e.g. Chateauraynaud and 
Torny 1999). The state-centrism of the French energy policy came under increasing 
pressure in the late 1990s, especially because of the creation of a common European 
electricity market (IEA, 2004, 7). The compatibility between nuclear energy and 
liberalisation, and the role of the state-owned EDF in the future electricity markets 
raised increasing discussion. Also the anti-nuclear critics increasingly used economic 
arguments in support of their case. The entry in power of the Greens as part of the 
socialist government in 1997 contributed to the final abandonment of the fast breeder 
reactor programme, ‘Superphénix’ in 1997.25 This symbolically significant victory to 
the French anti-nuclear movement led to the creation of the anti-nuclear network 
“Réseau sortir du nucléaire” in December 1998. As part of this new activism, NGOs 
also increasingly brought in arguments by international experts to lend credibility for 
their case. Questions concerning radioactive waste management declined in 
importance on the national-level nuclear policy agenda, but conflicts persisted at the 
local level. For instance, strong local opposition postponed the selection of a second 
site for an underground research laboratory on geological disposal (IEA, 2004, 147). 
 
Similar to the Sellafield leukaemia affair in the early 1980s, two studies, in 1995 and 
1997, demonstrated an increased incidence of leukaemia among children living near 
the radioactive waste reprocessing plant in La Hague. To respond to local concern, an 
independent, pluralist expert group was set up to examine the issue. The ‘Groupe 
radioécologie Nord-Cotentin’ (GRNC), jointly governed by the ministries of health 
and the environment, brought together for the first time representatives from the 
nuclear power industry, institutionalised official expert organisations, ‘counter-
experts’ from local and national NGOs (e.g. ACRO, CRIIRAD and GSIEN), and 
foreign experts (Gadbois et al., 2007; Miserey, 2007, 108).26 
 
New legislation both at the European level and in France continued to foster 
transparency, participation and deliberative democracy.27 The CNDP’s role was 
                                                 
25 The abandonment of Superphénix was part of the deal between the Greens and the socialists in the 
government-building process. Today, 857 organisations belong to the Réseau sortir du nucléaire 
(http://www.sortirdunucleaire.org/). 
26 While being a major step forward in terms of transparency and pluralist expertise, the work of the 
GRNC has nevertheless suffered from the limited mandate of the group. Its task is only to assess the 
impact of nuclear installations, not to call into question the waste management options themselves. 
Hence, assessing issues such as the extent to which AREVA complies with its commitment to the 
reduction of waste generation, as stipulated under the OSPAR Convention, falls outside the remit of the 
GRNC. (Sugier, 2007) 
27 The EU Aarhus Convention entered in force in 1998, providing for the right of public access to 
environmental information, public participation in those processes, and access to justice. In France, 
there were attempts to codify the modalities of participation, through the Charter of participation 
(Charte de la concertation) drafted by the Ministry of the Environment in 1996 (Blondiaux 2004, 12). 
Top-down participatory processes were tested, at experimental level, such as the ‘neighbourhood 
councils’, closely controlled by the municipal authorities, which became mandatory in towns with more 
than 80 000 inhabitants in 2002 (Blondiaux, 2004). 
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consolidated in 2002, when it was granted a status of an independent government 
institution. 
 
The radicalisation of the anti-nuclear movement and the ensuing polarisation of the 
debate were part of the multiplication in the French society of new citizen movements 
engendered by the ever more frequent public controversies and ‘scandals’. To a 
greater degree than before, these movements built network across issue areas, both 
nationally and internationally.28 
 
Finland 
 
While the UK had largely buried its plans for new nuclear build and France became 
critical of its existing fleet, Finland still wanted to go ahead with a 5th reactor. 
Finland had been planning to build a fifth nuclear plant since the late 1970s/early 
1980s following the completion of the four existing plants. Decision for the fifth plant 
was almost made in 1986, but the issue did not proceed following the 1986 Chernobyl 
accident. New nuclear built was debated again in 1993 but the decision was turned 
down by the Finnish parliament. The general belief especially amongst those 
opposing nuclear power was that after the 1993 decision new nuclear plants in 
Finland were confined to history (Kojo, 2004b). However, at the end of 2000 TVO 
applied for a licence to build a new reactor which resulted in a public debate over the 
issue during 2001 and 2002, with opinion polls suggesting that a slight majority of the 
Finnish population were against a fifth plant. The Finnish Energy Attitudes survey 
from 2001 showed that 36.8 % supported the building of a 5th reactor, while 44% 
were against (Energia-asennetutkimus, 2001). The debate surrounding the 5th reactor 
was also largely affected by Finland’s policy on nuclear waste. Several MPs 
considered that the waste issue was “solved”, given that the government had made a 
decision in principle in 2000 to allow research in waste disposal at Olkiluoto, even 
though this was only a decision to start research in to the possibility of final disposal 
(Kojo, 2004b).  
 
 
Period V: The revival of nuclear (FRA 2003-; UK 2005-; FIN 2000-) 
 
UK 
 
The transparency and the cautious attitude towards nuclear energy turned out to be but 
a short interlude in UK energy policies, as  the style and the substance of the policy 
changed again, only a couple of years after the publication of the 2003 White Paper. 
Nuclear power was this time portrayed as a solution to climate change and energy 
security problems. Security of supply had received increasing attention by the 
government energy policymakers and policy insiders already in the late 1990s, as 
demonstrated for instance by the creation of the government Joint Energy Security of 
Supply Working Group (JESS) in 2001. Around 2005, security of supply seemed to 
                                                 
28 An emblematic example of this new era of contestation was the creation, in 1997, of ATTAC – an 
anti- (or alter-) globalisation movement active at local, regional, national and international levels. 
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regain its position as the first energy policy objective, which it had temporarily lost to 
climate change mitigation. Also the policy style seemed to revert back to the previous 
opaqueness, exemplified by the more or less overt attempts by the government to 
legitimise its pro-nuclear position (Lovell et al. 2009; MacKerron 2009). 
 
In November 2005, Prime Minister Blair announced that a new major energy policy 
review would be needed urgently. Official reasons were the instability of world 
energy markets (price increases) and UK’s increasing dependence on gas imports, 
especially from Russia (DTI 2006), yet the alleged hidden agenda was to launch a 
new nuclear programme (Adams 2007 (FoE 2007; Lovell et al. 2009).29 
 
The new energy review, launched in January 2006, reflected the policy changes. 
Stakeholders were allowed only twelve weeks to produce written responses 
concerning the hastily put-together consultation document, and neither wide-ranging 
stakeholder engagement nor any direct public involvement were organised. Soon after 
the closing of the consultation, without waiting for the analysis of consultation 
responses from DTI, Blair announced that nuclear power was “back on the agenda 
with a vengeance”. (MacKerron 2009; Scrase and Ockwell 2009).  
 
The publication of the final Energy White Paper was postponed until May 2007, as a 
result of a successful court appeal by Greenpeace, accusing the government of having 
failed to provide the promised ‘fullest consultation’ before any new decision on 
nuclear new-build. The findings of the High Court deeming the consultation the 
‘misleading’, ‘seriously flawed’, and ‘manifestly inadequate and unfair’ were echoed 
by a broad range of commentators,30 who suggested that the process had been a mere 
smokescreen to decisions that had already been taken.31 
 
This rapid change in policy represented a challenge also for the CoRWM. 
Government now openly flagging for nuclear new-build, it was difficult to justify that 
the committee should adhere to its original mandate of only analysing UK legacy 
radioactive waste. Despite CoRWM’s clear statement that its conclusions should not 
be taken as either green or red light to new-build, the alleged ‘solution’ to the waste 
issue provided by CoRWM was used by the government in its argumentation for new 
nuclear power. 
 
                                                 
29 Indirectly, the rise of energy security on the policy agenda also fostered the change in policy 
approach, as many energy sector insiders now identified an aggravating and quantifiable, ‘objective’ 
problem, whose solution would be a task for experts – no further consultation would therefore be 
needed (Interviewee 2). 
30 These included the chairman of the Trade and Industry Committee, the Sustainable Development 
Commission, as well as two House of Commons committees: the one on the environment and the other 
on trade and industry. Dorfman (2008, 10) notes that the consultation process “was ill-conceived, 
carried out over too short a timescale, and did not involve the public in any meaningful way.” Also the 
methods used by the stakeholder engagement consultant hired by the government were criticised for 
misleadingly portraying nuclear new-build as a solution to climate change. (Greenpeace 
2007)(Dorfman, 16). 
31 Indeed, Prime Minister Tony Blair famously noted, following the judicial review ruling, “this will 
change the consultation, this won’t affect the policy at all”.  
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Some observers  have seen the change in the policy style and substance between 2003 
and 2007 as not surprising, but rather as a return to normal and an expected outcome 
from a consultation process designed primarily to put off difficult yet important 
decisions. Once the discussion would start on the means to achieve the objectives laid 
out in the White Paper 2003, and especially if renewables and climate policies were to 
head into trouble, the old debates, including those on the role of nuclear power, would 
unavoidably reappear, and the pro-nuclear groups within the DTI would gather force. 
Another way to put the issue was that the 2003 White Paper was a victory of the 
environment department (Defra) over the energy department (DTI), and represented 
as such an anomaly (Mather 2008).32 This return to the normal was clearly facilitated 
by the lobbying in the media and behind the scenes by nuclear industry and pro-
nuclear DTI officials, which had began soon after the publication of the White Paper 
2003 (Tweena 2006, 19). Finally, the role of the Prime Minister Blair was primordial. 
Arguably, Blair set up of the PIU in order to bring back the control of energy policy to 
the Cabinet, away from the energy ministry officials, but did foresee the full 
consequences such a shift.33 
 
Two framings were characteristic to the pro-nuclear arguments. On the one hand, the 
risks of an uncontrolled climate change were contrasted with those of the highly 
improbable nuclear accidents and radiation effects.34 On the other hand, a science-
based, rational approach was portrayed in opposition to ‘irrational fear’. The Energy 
Minister Malcolm Wicks hence proclaimed that “now is the right time for a cool-
headed, evidence based assessment of the options open to us… I want to sweep away 
historic prejudice and put in its place evidence and science” (Wicks 2005), followed 
by the Government Chief Scientist’s assertion that “we have no alternative to nuclear 
power” (King 2006).  
 
France 
 
In France, the nuclear revival was less drastic and started slightly earlier than in the 
UK, not least because nuclear never disappeared from the French policy agenda in the 
same way as it had in the UK. The high dependence on nuclear electricity and the late 
and far less radical liberalisation of electricity markets had certainly contributed to 
this stability. In 2003, nuclear accounted for 77.6% of the total electricity generated in 
                                                 
32 Mather (2008, 14) mentions how the concerns for security of supply and ability of other energy 
sources than nuclear to achieve the needed GHG emission cuts expressed during PIU work did not feed 
into the final reports of either PIU or the White Paper 2003: “although the ministerial team at the 
Department of Trade and Industry was positive towards nuclear renewal and in particular Brian Wilson 
the Minister for Energy was enthusiastic about the possibility, more powerful figures at the Department 
for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, including the Secretary of State Margaret Beckett MP, the 
Minister of State Michael Meacher MP and the Junior Minister Elliot Morley MP, all firmly from the 
Labour left, were strongly opposed.” 
33 According to this line of argument, the PIU review was simply too radical for its time, and it was 
foreseeable that the PIU recommendations would be subsequently watered-down in the White Paper 
2003. Likewise, while Blair had his strong policy convictions and objectives, in order to achieve those 
objectives, he actually had to start manipulating the evidence. (I9) 
34 For instance the Nuclear Industry Association (NIA), which retains strong links with public bodies 
such as BNFL re-branded in 2003 its website, which now runs under the banner heading “Nuclear: 
Climate Friendly Energy” (Tweena 2006, 25). 
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the country. Including nuclear electricity for exports, the French nuclear plants 
generated an equivalent of 92% of the country’s domestic electricity needs. (IEA, 
2004, 141) 
 
Between March and May 2003, the government organised a “national debate on 
energy”, in preparation of a major new energy law (Loi d’orientation sur l’énergie), 
which would set the general course of energy strategy for the next thirty years. The 
debate took place when a consortium constituted by Areva and Siemens was bidding 
for the contract to construct the new EPR plant in Finland, to become the first nuclear 
reactor built in a Western country since Chernobyl. A wise-men’s committee of three 
was constituted to ensure the “balance, pluralism and pedagogical value of the 
debate”. These debates were widely regarded as a poorly disguised attempt by the 
government to legitimise decisions already made.35 However, the debate was 
groundbreaking in that it for the first time in history gave the citizens a say, even if 
only symbolically, in the French energy policy. Moreover, even the critical NGOs 
valued the opportunity to discuss the future of renewable energy (Gueorguieva-Faye 
2006). 
 
The resulting ‘Besson report’ on the national energy strategy, released on 8 October 
2003, underlined energy independence, combat against climate change and ensuring 
competitive prices as the key objectives of energy policy. As key measures to achieve 
these objectives, it highlighted demand management in France and low-carbon 
electricity sources especially in the developing countries, as well as the need for 
dialogue with citizens to gain acceptance especially for waste management solutions. 
A relaunch of nuclear power was portrayed as a necessary, especially at the global 
level, to avert harmful climate change. Despite some disagreement within the group of 
wise men, the report ended up recommending the construction of a pilot EPR plant.  
 
The Besson report illustrated a number of key framings characteristic to subsequent 
French debate on nuclear energy. Firstly, the emphasis on “pedagogy”, the need to 
educate citizens, demonstrates the persistence of the old ‘deficit model’ of public 
communication. Second, nuclear energy is explicitly portrayed as indispensable to 
avert climate change and secure the country’s energy independence. Third, the stress 
on the international nature of the challenges gives the French nuclear exports the 
noble task of solving problems of global nature. Fourthly, the economics of nuclear 
power, especially the price per kWh in the liberalised markets, became a key topic in 
the debate. Finally, the report’s emphasis on the need to gain social acceptance, and 
the parallel debate organised by the NGOs, illustrate the prevailing atmosphere of 
mistrust and polarisation of views. 
 
In this atmosphere of general scepticism created by the energy debate, the National 
Commission of Public Debate (CNDP) organised three nuclear-related public debates 
in 2005-2006. One was designed to inform parliamentary debate on a draft bill on 
nuclear waste management, another concerned the construction of a new European 
                                                 
35 Daniel Boy, personal communication, 17 March 2008. 
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Pressurised Reactor (EPR) plant in Flamanville, and a third one the high-voltage 
transmission line designed to link the EPR to the national grid.  
 
The scepticism regarding the EPR debate was not eased by the fact that the 
government already seemed to have made up its mind well in advance. At the release 
of the “Besson report”, the industry minister Nicole Fontaine had openly flagged in 
favour of the construction of an EPR reactor, prompting criticism from Greenpeace, 
the Greens, associations and a number of prominent individuals.36 In December 2003, 
the EDF presented the EPR project to its personnel, and parliament endorsed the 
project in April 2004. Flamanville was chosen as the site for the new reactor in 
October 2004 – primarily for reasons related to regional economic interests and 
anticipation of local opposition, rather than to ‘objective’ technical criteria. The 
debate on the EPR was due to start in October 2005, a few months after the EDF had 
started construction (in April 2005). The scene was therefore set for a politically 
highly explosive debate, which many suspected would simply serve to legitimise a 
decision already made. The CNDP decided to give the debate a national focus, to 
cover not only the localisation of the plant, but the entire programme of construction 
of EPRs (Chateauraynaud et al., 2005).  
 
In September 2005, the government demanded the removal of a statement that had 
appeared in the pre-submission to the CNDP debate on the EPR reactor by the anti-
nuclear network “Réseau sortir du nucléaire”, on the grounds that the statement 
contained information classified as confidential under the defence secrecy legislation. 
After a failed compromise solution by CNDP, rejected by the industry minister, and 
less than a week before the debate was scheduled to begin, all national anti-nuclear 
NGOs withdrew their participation, and declared they would instead conduct their 
protests ‘from the outside’. 
 
In view of the difficult circumstances, the CPDP set up for the task managed 
relatively well, partly thanks to improvisation and creativity37 (Chateauraynaud et al. 
2005). While far from ideal, the debate was nevertheless generally considered as a 
step towards improved democracy. With the ‘defence secrecy affair’, transparency 
and access to information were firmly on the nuclear policy agenda. The debate was 
probably more important for the future of the CNDP and the French democracy than 
for nuclear policy as such. Indeed, the main concrete outcome of the debate was the 
commitment of the EDF to improve access to information by certain associations and 
academics. Discussions about the future of nuclear power in France was postponed 
until 2015-2020 – a period when the need to replace the existing nuclear capacity was 
forecast to arise (Ballan et al., 2007). More important was that the debate seemed to 
have improved the authority and status of the CNDP in the eyes of the anti-nuclear 
                                                 
36 Such as the former environment minister from the Juppé government Corinne Lepage, a widely 
respected environmentalist Nicolas Hulot, and the economist Benjamin Dessus. 
37 For instance, it organised thematic preparatory workshops led by a journalist, in order to put 
forward and highlight some of the existing controversies around the project. (Chateauraynaud et al. 
2005) 
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critics, and that the innovations that the CPDP was forced to come up with would 
serve as examples for similar future debates. (e.g. Zonabend 2007; GC 2006) 
 
The national debate on radioactive waste management had a better starting point than 
the one on the EPR, since it was specifically designed to inform parliamentary debate 
on a draft bill on nuclear waste management. The law, adopted in 2006, stipulated on 
the continuation of research into different management options, reversibility of the 
management options, and on the organisation by ANDRA of a national debate  prior 
to final decisions on radioactive waste management in 2015 (CNDP, 2006a). The Law 
forced a considerable change in ANDRA’s operating philosophy, prompting it to 
develop its capacities of citizen participation and consultation, and making 
reversibility a key topic of ANDRA’s research.38 Nevertheless, long-term geological 
disposal still remains, implicitly or explicitly, the preferred option by the French 
nuclear industry (Gilbert and Bourdeaux, 2006, 17-24) (ANDRA 2008, 16). 
 
The waste debate drew from the anti-nuclear groups criticism similar to that against 
the EPR debate; the debate was called ‘bogus’, conducted under completely unequal 
premises (e.g. L'Homme, 2006). Others lamented the unclear objectives and rules of 
the debate, its failure to genuinely engage the public and go beyond mere provision of 
information, and the excessively rigid and formal rules, which tended to increase 
rather than reduce the existing asymmetries of power between the participants (Ballan 
et al, 2007). Some blamed the anti-nuclear groups, in turn, for having spread 
misleading propaganda (Nifenecker, 2006). 
 
The polarisation of the debate, which began in the late 1990s, has continued during 
the present period of ‘nuclear renaissance’. However, parallel with the polarisation 
was the process of blurring the lines between the pro- and anti-nuclear groups, in a 
manner similar to the one observed in the UK. On the one hand, moderate anti-nuclear 
organisations (e.g. Global Change) have also emerged, and on the other hand, the 
NGOs themselves are torn between the nuclear critics and advocates. In the same way 
as in the UK, some prominent French environmentalists have recently joined the pro-
nuclear camp.39 Finally, the social base of the protest has changed: unlike in the 
1970s, when anti-nuclear criticism came from Parisian intellectuals, today’s radical 
contestation movements have their roots at the local level.40 
 
Finland 
 
The Finnish nuclear industry’s hopes for a 5th reactor were never completely buried 
despite the effects of Chernobyl in 1986 and the government’s negative decision on a 
new reactor in 1993. At the turn of the millennium, TVO’s application for a new 
reactor was possible again amidst discourses of energy security and climate change. 
                                                 
38 Personal communication, Luis Aparicio, ANDRA, 16 September 2008. 
39 Among the most famous, Nicolas Hulot, presidential adviser during both Chirac’s and Sarkozy’s 
mandate; the ex-environment minister Brice Lalonde; and the energy and climate expert Jean-Marc 
Jancovici. 
40 Personal communication, Francis Chateauraynaud, 17 September 2008. 
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When decision to build new nuclear was debated in the government in 2002, the 
government’s Finance Committee argued that in order to maintain Finland’s 
competitiveness there was a need to secure competitive electricity prices for Finland’s 
energy intensive main industries, as well as secure long term energy supply (Finnish 
Government, 2002). This, it was argued, could be best secured by electricity 
generation which was based in Finland, rather than relying on imports from other 
countries such as importing natural gas from Russia. The Finance Committee also 
stated that Finland was likely to be hit by large natural gas price increases after 2010 
when the country was due to negotiate new long-term gas contracts. Another key 
issue was climate change and nuclear power was now portrayed as the cheapest low 
carbon option (Kyllönen, 2004).  
 
The Finnish Nuclear Energy Act requires that any decision on new nuclear build has 
to be made by government - a decision-in-principle which agrees that the project is in 
line with the overall good of society - this decision-in-principle is then brought to 
Parliament for examination. Before government makes its decision-in-principle, the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry must obtain a preliminary safety assessment from the 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK), and statements from the Ministry of 
the Environment, the nuclear site’s municipal council and its neighbouring 
municipalities. The decision-in-principle also requires a public hearing to be held for 
residents and neighbouring municipalities of the nuclear site, as well as relevant local 
authorities. Once built, the nuclear plant also requires an operation licence from the 
government. In May 2002 the Finnish parliament voted on the 5th reactor and decided 
in favour of it, becoming the first OECD country to decide to build a new nuclear 
reactor for several years. The vote was very close, with 107 votes for and 92 against. 
In December 2003 TVO and Framatome ANP (consortium of Areva and Siemens) 
signed a turn-key contract for a 1,600 MW Pressurised Water Reactor, with an 
estimated cost of around 3,2 billion euros. TVO applied for a construction licence at 
the beginning of 2004, which was granted by the government in February 2005. The 
full licensing process for the Olkiluoto 3 site is expected to take over a decade. The 
timeline for the licensing process can be seen from Table 1 below. However, note that 
due to delays, construction of Olkiluoto 3 is not expected to be finished until at least 
2011.  
  
Table 1: Timeline for a new nuclear decision in Finland 
New nuclear - 20 years in the making 
March 1986 TVO and Imatran Voima (state owned power company) apply for a 
licence for a 5th plant 
April 1986 Application withdrawn following Chernobyl accident 
May 1991 TVO and IVO make another application for 5th plant 
September 1993 Parliament votes 90-107 against new nuclear (despite Government’s 
positive decision-in-principle) 
November 2000 TVO submits an application for 5th plant to Government 
May 2001 Parliament approves the final disposal of all Finnish spent nuclear fuel into 
the bedrock of Olkiluoto 
January 2002 Government makes a positive decision-in-principle on TVO’s application 
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May 2002 Parliament votes 107-92 in favour of and approves the decision-in-
principle 
December 2003 TVO signs contracts with ANP - Siemens consortium 
February 2005 Government grants construction licence for Olkiluoto 3 and construction 
works begin 
Source: Länsimies, (2006) 
 
During the lobbying period for the new reactor, the Finnish electricity industry had 
four key messages in support of new nuclear (Länsimies, 2007; Sund, 2009): 
 
1. energy security - new nuclear reduces dependence on imported electricity 
2. climate change - nuclear is low carbon and helps Finland to fulfil its Kyoto 
commitments 
3. guaranteed production - new nuclear covers partly additional electricity demand 
and replaces old power plants 
4. economics - new nuclear secures stable and predictable electricity price to the 
owners and stabilizes the electricity price in the Nordic market area 
 
These issues were high in the agenda in the public debate in the early 2000s.  Energy 
security and climate change were two important themes; the nuclear industry wanted 
to secure Finnish jobs by providing Finnish industries with “cheap” and low carbon 
electricity without having to rely on Russian exports. Those supporting nuclear power 
argued that the country was in need of new generating capacity to meet increasing 
demand, while those opposing new nuclear power argued that more ought to be 
invested in energy efficiency and renewables, and that climate change was used only 
as an excuse to build a new nuclear reactor. The Finnish environmental movement 
largely felt that they failed in their task of preventing the nuclear decision, especially 
in their arguments regarding the economics of new nuclear build (Kojo, 2004b). 
 
 
Reframing and the (in)stability of public opinion 
 
In all the three countries of France, the UK and Finland, public opinion surveys have 
demonstrated increasing support for nuclear new-build at least to replace the existing 
plants as they approach the end of their life-time. In all three countries, nuclear is 
increasingly perceived as the lesser risk when weighed against the impeding problems 
of energy security and climate change. Lesourne (2008) reports on surveys conducted 
in the UK in 2005 (by Deloitte Touche) and 2006 by (YouGov), in which 35% and 
40% of the respondents, respectively, were in favour of nuclear. The share rose to 
62% and 68%, if nuclear new-build was coupled with a concerted policy of promotion 
of renewables. According to surveys conducted by IPSOS-MORI and Deloitte Touche 
in 2006, 40% and 45% were for the replacement of existing reactors. In Finland, 
support for nuclear power varies from one to another, and the results therefore must 
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be interpreted with caution.41 In 2008, 43% of Finns supported new nuclear build, 
while 25% wanted to phase out nuclear (Kiljunen, 2009). 
 
Bickerstaff et al. (2008) describe the British public attitude as ‘reluctant acceptance’, 
i.e. when presented against the impending danger of climate change, the risks of 
nuclear power seem acceptable even to people a priori hostile to nuclear power. 
However, Bickerstaff et al. (2008) argue that the reframing may well remain an 
unstable one, in the light of the ‘institutionalised scepticism’ that has come to 
characterise UK public’s views concerning public governance of science, resulting “in 
part, to the problematic experience of science and technological decision-making in 
the UK over the past two decades.” Vested interests, hidden agendas and the short-
termism inherent to UK politics are seen to compromise policy processes and 
undermine political rhetoric, and lead to secretive processes and attempts by nuclear 
industry to cover-up the safety problems. While science itself is trusted, the 
government institutions are seen as “unreliable, secretive and failing to execute their 
proper duties (or functions) to serve the public interest”. Chilvers and Burgess (2008) 
similarly estimate that the use by the government’s use of CoRWM conclusions as an 
argument in favour of new-build may well undermine a lot of the trust, goodwill and 
confidence built during the CoRWM process, while Dorfman (2008) draws similar 
conclusions on the negative impact of the ‘nuclear consultation’ on public trust in the 
government. 
 
Bickerstaff et al. (2008) suggest that under these conditions, citizens are unlikely to 
accept without contestation a frame resting exclusively on the risk-risk trade-off 
between nuclear and climate risks. Alternative framings from key environmental 
NGOs might gain popularity – for instance those stressing the poor case for new build 
on environmental (climate change) and economic grounds, furthermore arguing that 
renewable energy alone cannot deliver the necessary carbon emission reductions 
(Greenpeace 2005; Roche 2005; FoE 2004). The ultimate challenge to the dominant 
framings comes from the local level: the ‘reluctant acceptance’ is not manifest at the 
local level, since a vast majority (75-80%) would resist localisation of power plants in 
their proximity (Lesourne 2008). 
 
In France, despite the overwhelming role of nuclear in the country’s electricity 
supply, the public opinions have evolved in ways very similar to those in Britain. 
Lesourne (2008) reports on recent opinion polls, which show slight support for the 
gradual phasing out or reduction of the share of nuclear electricity. In 2005, 54% 
supported a gradual phasing out of nuclear energy (43% were against).42 These 
findings were confirmed in 2006: 50% of the surveyed were in favour of reducing the 
share of nuclear in electricity supply.43 However, French parliamentarians are far 
more positive about nuclear: in a survey conducted among parliamentarians soon after 
                                                 
41 For instance, the Finnish Energy Attitudes survey has measured opinion on different energy 
generation forms since 1983, though the questions have not necessarily stayed the same over the years. 
Results have also varied between different media and commentators have spoken about the significant 
influence of a pro-nuclear ‘media elite’ on the public opinion (Kojo, 2004b; Sund, 2009). 
42 A survey conducted by IFOP for the Green Party. 
43 A survey conducted in 2006 by the IFOP for the industry ministry. 
 26 
the publication of the Besson report in 2003, more than three-quarters of the MPs 
supported the continuation of the nuclear programme and the replacement of the 
existing reactors, while only 15% called for a gradual phasing out of nuclear.44 
Furthermore, even the citizens changed their view when asked to weigh the pluses and 
minuses of nuclear energy: in 2006, a slight majority considered the benefits of 
nuclear greater than it disadvantages.45 As the main benefits of nuclear, the citizens 
evoked the low price of nuclear electricity and the contribution of nuclear to energy 
independence and environmental protection. Radioactive waste was considered, in 
turn, as the main disadvantage associated with nuclear energy.  
 
More recent surveys have confirmed a similar rapid recent change in public risk 
perceptions in France as the one reported in the UK.46 Announcing the results under 
the headline “Nuclear perceived by the French as less risky than climate change”, 
IFOP reports that, when asked to rank a number of risks threatening the society, only 
27% place nuclear risks first, whereas for 53% climate change represents the greatest 
threat. In 2002, the estimation was the inverse, 33% judging nuclear and only 20% 
20% climate change as the greatest risk (Lesourne 2008). As a further indication of 
the new framing of nuclear power as a contribution to climate change mitigation, the 
percentage of people wanting to reduce the share of nuclear in energy mix had 
declined from 47% in 2002 to 33% in 2008. 
 
An analysis by d’Iribarne (2005) of the French attitudes towards radioactive waste 
suggests that also the French may have adopted an attitude of ‘reluctant acceptance’.  
Far from being ignorant about or incapable to assess the ‘real’ risks involved, the 
French citizens display significant lucidity in their attitude towards risks from nuclear 
waste. A widespread view is that since ‘zero risk’ is in any case unattainable, the 
solution must be to manage the inevitable risks as well as possible. In the same way as 
in the UK, the IFOP poll mentioned above47 reveals significant mistrust in 
government institutions: 70% of the polled would “not trust much” the government as 
a source of reliable information in a case of a nuclear accident. The potential 
instability of the current framing of nuclear as a key solution to climate change and 
energy security may well hold for France as well. This is all the more so given that the 
dominance of nuclear in electricity supply is increasingly viewed as a threat, rather 
than a guarantee security of supply, and the need to diversify the supply sources is 
widely regarded as necessary. In a context of deep scepticism towards the 
government’s willingness and ability to protect the public interest and the existence of 
a radical minority of anti-nuclear opposition, framings imposed by the government 
will continue to be challenged and new framings developed. It is likely that a major 
nuclear accident could therefore switch the opinions and framings again.48 
 
                                                 
44 http://www.dissident-media.org/infonucleaire/deba_nat.html 
45 In a survey conducted in 2006 by CREDOC for the energy and industry ministry. 
46 http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/energienucleaire.pdf 
47 http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/energienucleaire.pdf 
48 The fact that the above-mentioned IPOF poll, showing reduced support to nuclear phase-out, was 
conducted after safety incidents at the Tricastin nuclear plant in summer 2008 demonstrates that minor 
safety problems are not sufficient to overturn the present trends in framings and opinions. 
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Conclusions 
 
The analysis of the evolution of debates and institutions in the area of nuclear energy 
in France, the UK and Finland has highlighted a number of similarities and key 
differences at critical turning points of policy. Civil nuclear energy emerged in France 
and the UK as an offshoot of the countries’ military nuclear programmes and the early 
years were characterised by highly non-transparent decision-making, strong public 
trust in science, highly pro-nuclear media reporting, and the concentration of power 
into the hands of nuclear industry experts. This belief in the ‘official experts’ and the 
promise of nuclear power began to fade in the 1970s, with the rise of new, radical 
contestation movements, the gradual even though timid opening of the technocratic 
decision-making and the gradual separation of powers between the development, 
expertise, and regulation of nuclear power. The sometimes violent protest movements 
did not produce major policy changes, yet they were elemental in forcing the nuclear 
‘establishment’ to gradually increase transparency and develop more participatory and 
inclusive planning and decision-making procedures, a process which would gather 
speed with the manipulative communication by the government on the Chernobyl 
accident. 
 
In France, the protests of the 1970s laid the foundations for the emergence of 
‘counter-expertise’ in the area of nuclear energy. Independent experts were elemental 
in both France and the UK in drawing attention to hitherto neglected social, ethical 
and safety issues related to nuclear energy was crucial in both countries since the mid-
1970s throughout the 1980s, notably bringing radioactive waste management onto the 
table as a key concern. The chronic problems in gaining citizens’ acceptance for waste 
management solutions, especially at the local level, were crucial in all three countries 
for the development of more open and communicative approaches to planning. 
Radioactive waste management is likely to persist as a key determinant of decisions 
concerning new-build, as demonstrated for instance by the ease at which the decision 
on the new reactor was achieved in Finland once the waste problem was perceived as 
‘solved’, and by the UK discussions around the (ab)use of the waste management 
committee’s conclusions to justify new-build. 
 
Nuclear power has throughout its lifetime been closely linked, not only to security of 
supply but also to national security and sovereignty.  Each of the three countries has 
seen nuclear power as a means of generating ‘truly domestic’ electricity and as a 
source of national pride. This perception is probably the weakest in the UK, where the 
technical and safety problems in the 70s and the poor economics revealed in the 80s 
tarnished the image of the nuclear industry. Yet, the perception of nuclear as a 
‘national energy source’ persists in all three countries, as for instance the latest EPR 
was ‘sold’ to the public as a ‘Finnish nuclear power project’, despite the fact that the 
supplier was French and only about a quarter of the workforce comes from Finland. 
Furthermore, nuclear has been closely associated with the issues of national security 
and sovereignty, as demonstrated by the use of the ‘fear of Russia’ as a key argument 
in the Finnish discussion, and by the ‘defence secrecy affair’ in the French debate on 
the Flamanville EPR. 
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The first oil crisis marked the first clear difference between the development 
trajectories of the two countries, as France launched its ambitious programme leading 
to a nearly all-nuclear electricity sector, while the nuclear protagonists in the UK 
failed to implement the nuclear programmes, despite the fact that these were far less 
ambitious than the French policy. Reasons for the divergence include the existence of 
alternatives in the UK (notably coal and later gas), strong position of the coal 
workers’ unions, and – partly a result of the strength of the unions – the lack of cross-
party consensus on nuclear policy. The pro-nuclear position of the trade unions and 
the strength of the ‘Corps des mines’ technocracy further help to explain the French 
success in implementing the nuclear programme. Indeed, while the CEA no longer 
held the same monopoly position in the 1970s as it did in the 50s and 60s, it had not 
yet lost its clout to the same extent as the UK AEA. The strong trust of the French in 
their engineering elites still remained largely throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. 
However, it is in Finland, where the trust in engineers seems the strongest and most 
stable. 
 
Despite the recent seemingly successful reframing of nuclear energy as a solution to 
climate change and energy security concerns, nuclear protagonists and the 
governments in both countries face a formidable challenge in ‘selling’ further nuclear 
power to the populations highly sceptical about the elites’ and governments’ sincerity 
and trustworthiness notably concerning nuclear safety. This scepticism is particularly 
strong at the local level, especially against radioactive waste disposal repositories. 
These movements get support from the NGOs, which have gathered strength also in 
France, after a period of relative weakness in the 1980s and early 1990s. In the UK, 
the scepticism is unlikely to facilitate the government’s current attempts to fast-track 
the construction of nuclear power plants through measures such as the ‘streamlining’ 
of planning regulations and procedures. The list of current issues challenging the 
credibility of the French nuclear industry is long including the radioactive leaks in the 
Tricastin plant in 2008; the safety control concerns, construction delays and budget 
overruns in the Finnish EPR plant under construction; the debates around radioactive 
waste exports to Russia and uranium mining in Africa; French setbacks competition in 
the world markets for nuclear technology (e.g. South Korea); and the disputes 
between the top-level managers of Areva and EDF. 
 
Finally, while nuclear policymaking has, in all of the three countries, moved towards 
greater transparency and public engagement, the institutional solutions differ. The 
French system, founded on the exclusive monopoly of expertise and decision-making 
power held by the ‘corps des mines’, has taken longer to break than in the UK, yet 
transparency constitutes a key issue of debate, and the trend towards greater openness 
continues. One could even argue that the UK has recently taken long steps backwards, 
back towards technocracy and opacity, while the French have developed their own 
institutions of pluralist expertise and public debate (esp. CNDP). The paths of UK and 
France seem to converge also in the area of economics, which has traditionally had a 
far greater influence on UK than the French nuclear policy. At the time when France 
is in the gradual process of privatising its national energy industries, the UK is 
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seemingly giving up some of the ‘market dogmatism’ that has been the mainstay of its 
energy policy since the early 1980s. The analysis of the nuclear histories of the three 
countries suggests that the recent years’ convergence towards reframing of nuclear 
energy in terms of its contribution to climate change mitigation and greater energy 
security may not persist. Whether the new framings will result in a new convergence 
or distinct national trajectories remains a question for further research. 
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